All hourly time in this chapter is given in Central Time, which is local time in Waco, Texas.

Waco, Texas, is a quiet city with a population of 100,000. It is actually a religious oriented city in the Bible belt of America's heartland. But it also believes in law and order. Baylor University, one of the largest of the Southern Baptist educational institutions is located there. Baylor has had its own problems in recent years, as a power struggle developed between the conservatives and moderates. For practical purposes, the moderates now control the school. Waco is a community you probably would like to live in. It is tragic that the attention of the world had to be turned to this quiet city as a symbol of fanaticism. Actually, the fanatics are not in the city, but in a small city-block-sized compound ten miles east, near the small town of Elk.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) has about 2,200 agents, 21 field offices, and 5 regional offices scattered throughout the United States and its territories. In June 1992, it began investigating David Koresh. But a separate investigation also began that same month by the Waco Tribune-Herald. The newspaper had decided that a careful investigation was needed to expose what was going on, east of town, at the Mount Carmel headquarters of David Koresh.

As the Tribune-Herald investigation neared its close, federal agents asked the newspaper to wait for a time before telling the public what was going on in that compound. The newspaper waited a full month, and then, in the interest of public safety, decided it could wait no longer.

On Friday, February 26, the editor, Bob Lott, notified the ATF that they would be releasing part of the story the next day.

On Saturday morning, February 27, 1993, the Tribune-Herald went into print with some of the findings from its eight month investigative findings. It's editor, Bob Lott, considered it a duty to warn the public about "this menace in our community."

For several weeks, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) had been trying to decide how best to tackle Koresh and his compound, which is full of firearms. So when the February 27 edition of the Tribune-Herald came off the press, perhaps they felt it was time to go into action. But Ted Royster, an ATF special agent in Washington, D.C., later said the timing of the raid had nothing to do with the Tribune Herald releases.

The next morning dawned with an on-and-off drizzle. It was Sunday the 28^th. This was to be the morning. The federal agents went into action.

THE HOUSE ACROSS THE ROAD

About a month earlier, several men (some reports say only one or two) moved into a house situated just across from the entrance to the compound. It was later learned that the residents of the compound were suspicious of their new neighbors from the beginning, and sentries on duty at the windows of Koresh's Mount Carmel watched their every action with binoculars. They noted with concern that their new neighbors consisted of strong young men in their late 20s or early 30s. From time to time, some of these new neighbors would drive out in cars and later return. Something was up. Day and night sentry duty was increased, and that neighboring house was carefully watched, as well as the entire area around the compound.

UNDERCOVER AGENTS

On Saturday evening, February 27, a young man came to the compound and knocked on the door. He had been there before, and was expected. Desiring to know more about the Branch Davidians, with the thought in mind of joining them, he had come for an evening Bible study. Eagerly he listened as Koresh lectured to the entire group. At its conclusion, he asked if he could return the next morning for another study. Koresh agreed.

Sunday morning, February 28, was an overcast day. Arising early, as usual, everyone in the compound would normally have been busy with his or her regular duties. The men, having finished their morning exercise, would have been eating while the woman began their separate exercise regime, preparatory to beginning another day's chores throughout the building. Soon additional construction work would have begun.

But the activities were different this morning, an undercover agent later reported.

"[Tom Hill, an ATF official in Washington, D.C.] said the Davidians broke from their normal routine Sunday morning, which ATF took as an indication that they were tipped off about the raid that was coming."-Waco Tribune-Herald, March 1, 1993.

WAS KORESH NOTIFIED?

The young man knocked at the door for another study. This continued for a time, but then, at 8:30 a.m., Koresh was suddenly called away to answer a phone call. He was on the phone for some time, and the young man became more and more nervous. When Koresh finished the phone call, he had no more time for the young man. That was all right, the young man said, he had to leave right away himself, but would be back again that afternoon.

(What may be a more accurate version was learned several weeks later: One of Koresh's followers, who lived in the area, had met a reporter who was lost and trying to find Koresh's place. The follower immediately tipped off someone at the compound. Very concerned, the men tried to warn Koresh but he was busy with the Bible study with the agent and refused to be interrupted. So they telephoned a friend outside the compound, and told him to call in. When the phone rang, they went to Koresh and said he was wanted on the phone. As soon as he left the room, they told him the news. Orders were then given to prepare for an attack. When the Bible study was terminated, the agent left.)

The sentries, rotating on their 24-hour watch, were already in place. They saw the young man drive down the entrance road and, instead of turning off to the left (south) on the county road (called the EE Ranch Road), he drove to that house where the young men lived. A few minutes later, he got into his car and headed off down the road.

Another undercover agent in the compound that morning noted that, as soon as the phone call ended, Koresh had no time for anyone, but rushed over to read his Bible for several minutes, then arose and hurried off into another room. That agent, by prearranged timing, also left the compound and drove off. According to one story, he did not catch the significance of the situation. As he drove off, he sounded the "all clear." All agents were out, and the raid could begin.

However, there is another story: The Los Angeles Times reported that even before agents had deployed from the staging area in downtown Waco, one was heard shouting: "We gotta move. He's been tipped off. He's nervous and he's reading his Bible and he's shaking." ATF officials later denied that report. Unfortunately, they have refused comment on many other aspects of that Sunday morning raid, so mysteries remain.

There has been much speculation whether Koresh received a phone call on Sunday morning, tipping him off that the raid was about to begin. The ATF are convinced that he was.

"About 45 minutes before the shooting began, an agent who had infiltrated the cult's worship services saw Koresh get a phone call that he believes warned him that attackers were on their way."-Time, March 15, 1993.

"[Agent Tom] Hill confirmed the bureau had undercover agents within the compound before Sunday. None of those undercover officers were still inside at the start of the raid Sunday.

" 'We had our plan down. We had our diversion down. But they were waiting for us,' ATF Special Agent Ted Royster said."-Waco Tribune-Herald, March 1, 1993.

Later, in a telephone interview with CNN, Koresh said, "I knew they were coming. I knew they were coming before they knew they were coming."

It would not have been difficult for Koresh's group to anticipate the raid. For at least 12 hours, armed personnel and their vehicles had been at a staging area in downtown Waco. Soon they would be heading out the ten miles toward the compound.

If Koresh was so neurotic about guarding the compound that he would stock up on munitions and have 24-hour sentries, one might expect that he would rotate someone off the place to roam around and check up on what was happening within a wider area.

READY TO GO IN

After an eight-month investigation, the agency finally decided it had enough data to make a move, agents from three of the ATF's 21 field offices (Dallas, Houston, and New Orleans) began rehearsing for an air- and ground-assault.

Part of their preparation was based on a fairly good understanding of the layout of the compound, both inside, outside, and underground. They obtained their information, over a matter of months, from disgruntled, former followers who had left and from ATF agents who, pretending to be recruits, had lived and worked in the compound for a time, before leaving not long before D Day arrived.

Dan Hartnett, associate ATF director, later commented that undercover agents had earlier spotted numerous illegal weapons inside.

They had practiced for days, and were sure they knew exactly what to do. Ted Royster, special-agent-in-charge of the ATF's Dallas field office, said that, based on reports from local law enforcement officials and Mount Carmel's neighbors, ATF knew that Koresh and his followers were heavily armed, perhaps with machine guns and homemade bombs.

Royster later commented, "We practiced for it, we drilled over and over, and we had our plan down. All of it went into effect, and they were waiting." Then pausing, he added, "It appeared they knew we were coming."

According to plan, the raid was coordinated from a command post at Texas State Technical College. Their search warrant stated that the agents would be looking for various weapons and "homemade" explosives. About an hour after the last agent left the compound (other reports say 45 minutes after the phone call ended), they moved in.

The gun battle erupted about 9:55 a.m. (some say 9:45), but, as usual, there is no place like America: The news reporters had already begun arriving near the cult compound 45 minutes earlier! It appears they had been monitoring the police band, and caught wind that something was about to take place. The Waco Tribune-Herald, alone, had seven staffers in the area of the compound when the shooting started

Sunday morning. One cannot help wondering if any of the Davidians- in or out of the compound- ever listened to the police band. It is not difficult to buy radios which track those bands. They could have been monitoring police scanners, just as the reporters had done.

It is of interest that the Waco Tribune-Herald reported that, just before the raid, a voice came over the police scanners, saying: "There's no guns in the windows. Tell them it's a go." If Koresh had a scanner, that would have settled it for him.

THE CONVOY ARRIVES

As two trailer loads of agents turned off the county road, EE Ranch Road, into the main entrance road of the Davidian property, news teams in two Broncos tagging along just behind, continued on the county road to a point just opposite the main entrance of the compound. Climbing out, they began setting up their cameras as the men in the trailers began jumping out. As I say, there is nothing like America.

But now, let us return to that convoy of agents: Right on schedule, the two heavy-duty pick-up trucks, pulling large livestock trailers came down the county road, heading north. At the front entrance, they turned right and headed east up to the front side of the compound. What happened next? Even now, that is a very controversial question.

WHO FIRED FIRST?

One view is that the ATF agents jumped out of their trailers-and opened fire on the building. The other view is that they asked for entrance, in order to search for weapons, and those inside fired on them.

What actually happened? Here is the studied opinion of the present writer:

(1) The ATF had practiced this raid for weeks. We will assume that no ATF leader would be foolish enough to send his men in and immediately open fire on a houseful of men, women, children, and old people.

(2) When the ATF arrived, they immediately sent men around different sides of the compound, and even put up ladders and climbed onto roofs. If they had opened fire immediately, they could not have done all that.

(3) Helicopters were hovering overhead, to provide an air view of the entire place. It has been said that, if the ATF was planning to fire on the building, they would not have brought those helicopters in so close.

(4) Earlier in this book, we have learned a lot about David Koresh, his ambitions, goals, and fears. He had to constantly have his people with him, under his control. He dare not give this authority to someone outside. For him to open the door and let the ATF in would be to destroy his own authority.

(5) The theology of Koresh was this: He would win in a shoot-out with the wicked outside world, but never in a surrender to it. For him to meekly let the agents in would be to betray all he had dreamed and taught his followers for years. The end of the world and victory for the Davidians would only come through armed conflict with the enemy. That was his thinking, and there is no reason to believe he swerved from it.

THE SHOOT-OUT

With that in mind, we will now proceed to the most frequently presented accounts of what happened next:

Right on schedule, two large livestock trailers came down the road, and drove up to the front side of the compound. About 100 agents (other reports say 50), dressed in blue jumpsuits and flak jackets, were inside. As the wheels slowed, they began jumping out. According to plan, some ran around to the sides of the house, and some took lightweight ladders and quickly climbed side roofs, so they could enter gable windows. Many agents were in front, and-even before all the agents could get out of the trailers (remember: everything happened fast)-the front door opened and David Koresh appeared. Immediately a lead agent hollered out his request for entrance. They wanted to search for illegal weapons.

Koresh smiled that eerie smile of his, paused for a moment, and then suddenly slammed the door as hard as he could. It is likely that this was the signal, for the noise of it could be heard throughout the house.

Immediately, automatic weapons began firing from inside the house. Bullets came out partly open windows; they came out through the walls! It was literally a rain of terror.

According to another version, the agents leaped out of the cattle trucks, throwing concussion grenades and screaming, "Come out!" The response was a brutal hail of gunfire.

Either way, it would appear that the Davidians fired their weapons first. (Yet the Davidians would later claim that the government agents were first to begin shooting.)

It all happened so quickly that some of the agents later claimed that the men inside opened fire before they had time to even say why they had come.

" 'From the moment we stepped out of the trailer we were under fire from everywhere,' says one agent who was pinned to the ground for 45 minutes."-Time, March 15, 1993.

It is understandable that, because the action began so fast, different agents would describe those first moments in different ways.

Here is Koresh's version of how the shooting began, as later told by phone to a Dallas radio station: Koresh, who was shot in the arm and leg in the initial shooting, claimed he had opened the door to the compound to ask what the ATF agents wanted, when they fired on him. Cult members returned the fire, he said.

Just as most of the men had reached various sides of the compound, the flap, flap, of helicopters sounded and three helicopters, on loan from the Texas National Guard, arrived overhead. Simultaneously, as ATF officers stormed the front of the compound, two Apache helicopter and one Sikorsky Blackhawk helicopter buzzed the compound from the northeast. The Blackhawk hovered like an angry wasp just above the buildings of the compound.

Although designed to provide both overhead surveillance, as well as intimidate those inside the compound into surrendering. The terrific wind and clap-clap noise of it all probably only added to the confusion.

Keep in mind that the ATF apparently was expecting a speedy surrender, with, perhaps, a few traded shots before it was over to liven things up.

But, instead, they were met by a volley of shots from windows and walls, and the compound was full of windows and walls.

The high, square watchtower, in the center of the building complex, was especially helpful. Fire rained down from that tower on the agents. And the fire went up too. The two nearest hovering helicopters were repeatedly hit by gunfire from the tower. That gunfire quickly caused the helicopters to retreat.

For 20 or 30 minutes, the gunfire abated, and thereafter, only resumed sporadically throughout most of the rest of the day. Four ATF agents were killed and 14 were wounded during the air- and ground-attack. The amazing part is that so few were killed or injured!

Before the day was over, the total was 4 agents killed and another 15 wounded; two Davidians killed and one more presumed dead. (Later on, it would be discovered that still more inside the compound had been slain or wounded.)

Several ATF officers used ladders to climb the walls of the compound. But, as they stepped onto the roofs, they were shot at from the gable windows. Much of the firing came from the tower in the center of the compound. Of the four federal agents killed during the initial assault, three were hit on the roofs and one was killed elsewhere.

These three agents on the roof were trying to enter an upstairs window when they were shot. Dan Maloney, a news photographer with KWTX-Waco, filmed the assault while hiding behind a bus. Two agents had gone through the window, then a burst of automatic fire went through the wall, wounding an agent crouching outside. He fell to the roof, then managed to climb to a ladder and slide down. Special Agent Ted Royster of Dallas later said that two agents died on the roof, and the third, after he climbed back down the ladder. He did not know at the time how the fourth agent died.

Whether or not shooting from inside was anticipated, why did the ATF try to force its way into the compound? Why did they not just plan on a long siege and negotiation, or simply capture Koresh when he was out jogging? Jack Killorin explained the problem, and why the ATF decided to go in as they did:

"ATF spokesman Jack Killorin said that his bureau decided to move because it believed that during a long siege or even if Koresh were seized alone outside-cult members would opt for suicide, taking the children with them. And almost all [earlier] showdowns with determined and fanatical groups have led to casualties, he insisted, no matter how they were handled. 'We've gone about them in a number of different ways-ruse, ambush, siege and talk,' said Killorin. 'In almost every one, we lose law-enforcement officers.' "-Time, March 15, 1993.

This was the largest loss of life in the history of the ATF. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was created in 1972 to take over enforcement of laws related to alcohol, tobacco, guns, and explosives,-a task formerly assigned to the Internal Revenue Service. About 120 agents of the ATF and its predecessor have been killed during the line of duty since Prohibition became the law of the land in 1919.

In addition to ATF agents from the Dallas, Houston, and New Orleans field offices, other local and federal agencies were also involved. This included the McLennan County Sheriff's Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Marshal's Service. In addition to the three helicopters, the National Guard also provided other logistic support.

At 10 a.m., the helicopters began landing north of the compound. Two of them were hit by gunfire and forced to land for damage assessment. "At first it sounded like hail, then we realized it was gunfire," said Royster, who was in one of them.

THE HOSPITAL CRISIS

At about 10:15 a.m., the heaviest gun battle ended. This gave agents from the Department of Safety an opportunity to tell those press people, not pinned down by gunfire, to leave.

Ten miles west, in Waco, the two hospitals quickly became armed camps. As he stood guard at one of the two hospitals, Waco Police Sgt. Holly Holstien said, "There are some reports that some cult members got out of the compound and were heavily armed." Rumor had it that armed cult members were headed to the hospitals with their wounded. As a result, Hillcrest Baptist Medical Center and Providence Health Center swarmed with Waco police by mid-morning. Eleven police officers patrolled Providence, while 15, including the city's SWAT team, guarded Hillcrest.

"We can't afford to turn any of these buildings loose until we're sure that nobody's escaped from the compound," said Holstien.

But soon both hospitals had far more action than rumors to worry about.

Negotiations began with Koresh by phone, in a desperate attempt to get the wounded agents to hospitals for treatment. But Koresh was not so sure about that. Such mundane matters, as saving life, seemed of lesser concern. Far more important to him was to keep the battle going so the end of the world could come.

At 11:20 a.m., the last shot of the morning battle was fired. (Firing would resume again that afternoon.) A truce was reached so the wounded could taken to the hospital. Agents carried some to helicopters sitting in a field north of the compound, and begin loading them in. Others were taken to medical helicopters on state road 2491, a half-mile from the compound.

At 12:42 a.m., helicopters landed the first wounded at Providence Medical Center, 10 miles away in Waco.

Soon the two hospitals had their hands full with the wounded and dying. Janet Kemp, Providence spokesperson, said hospital officials executed their disaster plan, calling additional staff members. Hillcrest alone had more than 40 additional staff members at work, including more than 20 extra nurses, three emergency room physicians and at least seven additional doctors.

"We've called in people from all across the board," said Kim Averett at Hillcrest. "We've been so busy, we haven't had time to track them all."

Sixteen casualties from the shoot-out arrived at Hillcrest alone; three of them died.

Dr. William Daney, head of the emergency room at Hillcrest, who has spent most of his adult life in emergency medicine, said he had never before seen such carnage. "I have never seen as many deliberate gunshot wounds in all my years in emergency medicine."

Providence vascular surgeon, Dr. William Peper said the federal agent he operated on was hit at least six times by a variety of weapons. "This is a true war situation," he concluded.

Some agents lay in their blood until noon. After more than two hours of gunfire, a truce was negotiated by phone with Koresh, so that the ATF could remove their dead and wounded. Commandeering a TV truck, the agents pushed their vehicles out of the compound entrance road.

Finally, by 12:20 p.m., two CareFlite hospital helicopters landed half-a-mile down the county road, which fronted the set-back compound, and began loading the seriously wounded. Within half an hour, a spokeswoman at a Waco hospital announced the death of the first ATF officer.

SUNDAY AFTERNOON

What about the dead and wounded inside the compound? Agents tried to get Koresh to send them out so they could be treated, but he was more interested in discussing his theories with them. He considered the seven seals more important than helping the injured.

The primary gun battle took place between 9:45 (or 9:55) and 10:15 a.m.; gunfire continued sporadically throughout the afternoon. At 5 p.m., Ted Royster of the ATF announced that it was still going on.

Fearful of what might be in Koresh's western outpost, the La Verne, California, police hurriedly prepared search warrants and that afternoon entered Koresh's harem house at' 2707 White Avenue. They found three people, but no weapons, reported Sgt. John Hackworth.

In addition, California police were giving shelter to several former cult members who, fearing that Koresh might somehow send someone to kill them, went to the police for protection.

At that 5 p.m. news conference at the Dallas ATF Field Office, Ted Royster summarized the days' happenings. He said the death of four agents marked the deadlist day in the agency's history.

As told to CNN in a phone interview, that evening, Koresh telephoned his mother, Bonnie Halderman, in Chandler, Texas. Finding her not at home, he left this message on her answering machine:

"Hello, Mama, It's your boy. . They shot me and I'm dying, all right? But I'll be back real soon. Okay? I'll see y'all in the skies."

According to a different version of this story, reported by a former cult member, his mother answered the phone, received the message that he was wounded and dying-and then there was silence on the line. She dropped the phone in hysteria.

About 4 p.m., the ATF asked KRLD radio in Dallas to broadcast a message to Howell, that the agency would not use aggression if he were willing to give up. KRLD broadcast the message several times. Later, in a telephone interview with KRLD, Koresh said he was the most seriously wounded of three people inside the compound. "I've been shot. I'm bleeding bad. I'm going home. I'm going back to my father. Your weapons have overcome me this time. I begged these men to go away." He began to cry, as he talked about the 2-year-old baby which had died. He said she was his own daughter.

When asked about his wounds, he replied that he had been hit "in the gut and the leg." But, from Koresh's description of his wounds, physicians recognized that he only had two superficial flesh wounds: one in the hand and another in his leg.

SUNDAY EVENING

Over the KRLD, early that evening, Koresh said: "There are a lot of children here. I've had a lot of babies these past two years. It's true that I do have a lot of children and I do have a lot of wives." Prior to this, in contacts with the public press, Koresh had always denied having more than one wife and two children.

Within the next few days, it was obvious to telephone negotiators that Koresh was recovering quite well from his flesh wounds.

At 6 p.m., the shooting by cult members increased. ATF agents returned the fire. Three men burst out of the compound, In the shooting that followed, one cult member was killed, another was captured, and a third wounded, but able to get back into the compound.

At 7:30 p.m., cult leader, David Koresh, was honored with a full-scale interview by CNN.

At 8:15 p.m., ATF spokeswoman, Sharon Wheeler, announced that gunfire had finally ended, and negotiations with Koresh was continuing.

Early that evening, Koresh said he would send out two children each time radio station KRLD played a message he had given them. The messages were played. At 9:15 p.m., Koresh released two children, and two more at 10:30 p.m. Before the evening was out, two more children were reportedly released. Unfortunately, it would be difficult, in the days ahead, to get many more out of the compound. Interviewing the children later, they were found to be in excellent physical, mental, and emotional condition. Life amid the unusual circumstances of the compound had not adversely affected them in the least.

Koresh's broadcast messages were primarily rambling ideas about his favorite topic: the seven seals in the book of Revelation. (His former followers declare that Koresh teaches that only he can open those seals. When he does so, it will set loose catastrophic events which will end the world. Somehow Koresh never gets around to opening those seals.)

At 10:05 p.m., Koresh began a twenty-minute talk, aired over KRLD Radio in Dallas, in which he described some of his beliefs. During it, he said that he was the most seriously wounded person in the compound.

Shortly before midnight, a hostage negotiation team from Travis County arrived. It brought six trucks, a portable electric generator and floodlights.

Reports indicated that about 70 people were inside the compound. Later it would be learned that there were more than a hundred in there, including 38 young children.

By that evening, calls had been sent out for more agents, supplies, and equipment. In addition, 10 Bradley fighting vehicles were requested.

One hundred federal agents took part in the first day's raid. By the end of the week, there would be 400 agents, plus state and local police, SWAT teams, armored personnel carriers, and Bradley fighting vehicles. Later still, Abrams tanks-heaviest in the U.S. Army-would be brought in for the final face-off with Koresh.

Two days after the greatest terrorist bombing in U.S. history-at the World Trade Center in New York City-one crazy man and his followers in a Texas pasture had wiped thoughts of that bombing out of the minds of most people in America.

Breathlessly, a nation waited. What would Koresh do next?

But, after that Sunday shoot-out, "one of the deadliest days in U.S. law-enforcement history," according to Newsweek, little more seemed to happen for fifty-one days.